Making UBB Simple for Anyone That Cares<\/b><\/p>\n
We have now passed one month since I delivered the letter to Senator Manchin and Governor Tomblin asking five basic and simple questions.\u00a0 The questions in short were:<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Have you personally looked at the U.B.B. gas samples?<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What have you done to prevent U.B.B. from happening again?<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Do you believe you have a responsibility for miner safety?<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Are you aware MSHA is requiring miner dust scrubbers to be turned off?<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Are you aware that some new legislation could make miners safer?<\/p>\n
Senator Manchin told the media on the day he received the letter that he would respond.\u00a0 Governor Tomblin has not said anything publicly to my knowledge.<\/p>\n
It is both obvious and frightening that these\u00a0West Virginia politicians see no urgent need to improve mine safety nor to get the truth out there about\u00a0the UBB\u00a0explosion.\u00a0 A truth that is necessary if they are to have any hope of preventing it from ever happening again.<\/p>\n
Coal miners deserve an answer as to why their scrubbers are being idled.\u00a0 They also deserve the enhanced safety and protection that they can receive from what was learned at UBB.<\/p>\n
The five questions the letter asks are not difficult questions for the politicians\u00a0to answer.\u00a0 It should not take a month to answer these questions.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 However, we can hope that their delay in answering is that they\u00a0are looking into the facts and learning the truth.<\/p>\n
Maybe it will help them to reflect on the following as they attempt to answer the questions.\u00a0 The investigative reports by MSHA, the WV Department of Mines, and Davitt McAteer essentially blame bad upper management, bad mine management, inadequate rock dusting, missing water sprays, missing cutting bits, and float dust for the explosion.<\/p>\n
These causes can be placed into two categories. First, badly intentioned management and second, this bad management\u2019s failure to control day-to-day mining challenges.\u00a0 The problem with this theory is that the upper management team and many of the workers that were meeting the challenges of day to day mining at UBB\u00a0had both been in place during the mines entire 16 years.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, on the day of the explosion (4\/5\/10) there were two major differences at the mine versus at any time during its prior 16 years.\u00a0 First (as directed by MSHA) a ventilation plan change was completed the weekend before the explosion that lessened the airflow.\u00a0 Second, the mine was suddenly inundated with a huge release of natural gas immediately prior to the explosion.<\/p>\n
Mining and accident investigations can be complex.\u00a0 However, blaming such an unusual event as the UBB\u00a0explosion on a management team and a work force that had been in place for years and on missing water sprays and mining bits is irrational.\u00a0 The huge natural gas inundation and less air are clearly the things that were different on April 5, 2010 \u2013 not the management, not the workforce, not the mines upkeep.<\/p>\n
This mine was under extreme MSHA and company scrutiny for several months prior to the explosion.\u00a0 As a result the mine was highly likely to have been in better shape on the day of the explosion than it was on some of its prior 5,000\u00a0days of mining.\u00a0 There is also no doubt it was in better condition on the day of the explosion than many\/most other coal mines that day.<\/p>\n
What was different that day at UBB than in prior years?\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0What was different at the UBB\u00a0mine that day\u00a0than at other mines? \u00a0\u00a0The answer – a lot of natural gas.\u00a0 Natural gas, as determined by chemists and based on the government\u2019s own samples and analysis.\u00a0 Also different than the prior 16 years was that the mines longwall face had less airflow on the day of the\u00a0explosion than during\u00a0its prior years of mining.<\/p>\n
In summary, coal mines that get inundated with huge volumes of natural gas are more likely to explode than those that do not.\u00a0 If mines that have lost cutter bits and water sprays or that don\u2019t have perfect rock dusting often exploded, the industry would have explosions every day.<\/p>\n
But mines don\u2019t explode every day.<\/p>\n
The UBB\u00a0mine was in the condition that MSHA\u2019s inspectors had pushed for it to be in.\u00a0 These inspectors did not anticipate a natural gas inundation.\u00a0 But rather than be honest after the explosion and attribute the explosion to the obvious causes\u00a0the politicians and MSHA launched a witch hunt. \u00a0 \u00a0They continue to defend their irrational untruth\u00a0even after four years.<\/p>\n
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<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Making UBB Simple for Anyone That Cares We have now passed one month since I delivered the letter to Senator Manchin and Governor Tomblin asking five basic and simple questions.\u00a0 The questions in short were: 1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Have you personally looked at the U.B.B. gas samples? 2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What have you done to prevent U.B.B. from happening again? 3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Do you believe … <\/p>\n